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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-STATE TAXATION
OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-SUPREMACY CLAUSE-The United
States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
Montana coal severance tax finding that it does not violate the
Commerce Clause and that it is not inconsistent with federal
legislation.
Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
In 1975 the state of Montana enacted a new tax schedule for its
coal severance tax.1 The new tax schedule provided for varying
rates up to a maximum of 30% of the contract sales price.2 In 1978,
four Montana coal producers and eleven of their out-of-state utility
company customers 3 filed an action in a Montana state court seek-
ing $5.4 million in refunds and an injunction preventing further
collection of the tax. They contended that the coal severance tax
was unconstitutional because it violated both the commerce 4 and
supremacy 5 clauses of the United States Constitution. The court,
without receiving any evidence, upheld the tax.' On appeal, the
Montana Supreme Court, relying on the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Company,7
1. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 613 (1981).
2. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1979) provides in pertinent part: "A
severance tax is imposed on each ton of surface mined coal produced in the
state [at a rate of] 30% of value [for coal with a] Heating quality [Btu per pound
of coal] over 7,000. "Value" means the contract sales price." Id
3. Montana exports 90/o of its coal to other states under long-term pur-
chase contracts with utilities such as the appellant, Commonwealth Edison Com-
pany. Under the contracts, costs of all state taxation are to be borne by the
utilities who, through fuel cost adjustment clauses, will pass the tax onto their
consumers. 453 U.S. at 617.
4. "Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6. 453 U.S. at 613. The trial court's opinion was not reported.
7. 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Heisler upheld a severance tax levied by Penn-
sylvania on coal, [80/o] of which was destined for interstate commerce. Penn-
sylvania was said to have a natural monopoly in anthracite coal and intended to
exploit this position. A mechanical test was expressed whereunder any com-
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affirmed8 holding that the tax does not violate the commerce
clause because the severance of coal is an intrastate activity which
preceeds the coal's entry into interstate commerce. Alternatively,
the Montana court held that as a matter of law, the tax complied
with the four-part test announced by the Court in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady.' The supremacy clause argument was
similarly discarded because the appellants did not show the Mon-
tana coal severance tax statute to be in opposition with any
federal law.10
After noting probable jurisdiction,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed." The Court held that the tax did not
violate the commerce clause because it satisfied the Complete
Auto Transit'" test for the constitutionality of state taxation of
interstate commerce. The Court also held that the tax did not
violate the supremacy clause because Congress had not pre-
empted state severance taxes on coal, but rather had explicitly
authorized the imposition of such taxes."
Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the Court, 5 turned
initially to the appellants' contention that the Montana Supreme
Court erred in relying on the Court's decision in Heisler to con-
clude that the coal severance tax is not subject to the commerce
clause.1" While the Court agreed that the Heisler reasoning has
modity was considered to be subject to state taxation while being produced
because this was a local activity and subject to federal taxation once the com-
modity was sold or shipped to customers in another state. Thus, any mining
with subsequent sale interstate was considered to be two separate and distinct
activities. Id at 259.
8. 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980).
9. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). For a state tax to not be violative of the commerce
clause, the four-part test of Complete Auto requires that the tax:
1. be applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state,
2. be fairly apportioned,
3. not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
4. be fairly related to services provided by the state.
Id. at 287.
10. 615 P.2d 861 (Mont. 1980).
11. 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
12. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
13. Id See supra note 9.
14. 453 U.S. at 631.
15. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Rehnquist
joined in the majority opinion. Justice White filed a separate concurrence.
Justice Blackmun filed a dissent in which Justices Powell and Stevens joined.
16. Id at 614. See supra note 8.
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been undermined by more recent cases,17 the Court refused to
overrule Heisler.18 Justice Marshall found no real distinction be-
tween the economic effect on interstate commerce of severance
taxes and that of other state taxes that have been subjected to
commerce clause scrutiny, and he acknowledged that states have
a significant interest in exacting from interstate commerce its
fair share of the cost of government. 9 Instead, the Court agreed
with the appellants that the Montana tax must be evaluated
under Complete Auto Transit's four-part test:20 A state tax does
not offend the commerce clause if (1) it is applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly appor-
tioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
and; (4) is fairly related to services provided by the state. 1
The Court noted that the appellants, although not disputing
that the tax satisfied the first two parts of the Complete Auto
Transit test, argued that the Montana coal severance tax in in-
valid under both the third and fourth parts of the test.2 The ma-
jority dismissed the appellants' assertion that the tax
discriminated against interstate commerce solely because 90/o of
Montana's coal is shipped to other states and noted that the tax
is computed at the same rate regardless of the final destination
17. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977) (held unconstitutional a North Carolina statute burdening apples from
out-of-state by a mandatory grading system); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970) (held unconstitutional an Arizona statute indirectly requiring
Arizona grown cantaloupes to be packaged within Arizona); Nippert v. City of
Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946) (held unconstitutional a Richmond ordinance
licensing requirement on solicitors as applied to interstate sales).
18. 453 U.S. at 617. Justice Marshall noted that Heisler was decided at a
time when the commerce clause was thought to prohibit state taxation of in-
terstate commerce. He observed that under this approach the distinction be-
tween interstate and intrastate commerce was crucial to the state's taxing
power. Rejecting the notion that a state tax or regulation is immune from com-
merce clause scrutiny because it attaches only to an interstate activity and re-
jecting the position that state taxation of interstate commerce is per se invalid,
Justice Marshall concluded that the Court's goal in reviewing commerce clause
challenges to state taxes has been to establish a consistent and rational method
of inquiry focusing on the practical effect of the challenged tax. Id
19. Id at 616. Consequently, he found the Heisler Court's concern that sub-
jecting taxes on local activities to commerce clause scrutiny would result in a
loss of state taxing authority no longer tenable. Id
20. Id at 617.
21. Id (quoting Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.)
22. Id
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of the coal, thereby making its administration even-handed.23 The
majority observed that the claim that a state tax is
discriminatory under the commerce clause if the burden falls
more heavily on out-of-state customers was considered and re-
jected in Heisler 4 and that the acceptance of the appellants'
argument would be a significant and unwarranted departure
from precedent. 5
The majority did not accept the appellants' argument that the
commerce clause gives the residents of one state the right to a
sister state's resources at reasonable rates."6 Refusing to inject
principles of antitrust law into the relations between states,
Justice Marshall noted that the threshold question of whether a
state enjoys a monopoly position that allows it to export its tax
burdens would require complex factual inquiries that might make
the Court's inquiry futile.'
Justice Marshall then stated that the appellants' assertion that
the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit text invalidated
the Montana coal severance tax because the tax is not fairly
related to the additional costs that the state incurs from coal
mining" revealed their complete misunderstanding of the nature
the inquiry under the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit
test.9 After noting the Montana Supreme Court's finding that
the coal severance tax is imposed for the general support of the
government, the Court stated that it had previously held that
states have considerable latitude in imposing general revenue
23. Id. at 617-18. Thus, the Court concluded that this case did not involve
different tax treatment for interstate commerce, a characteristic which was
fatal to state taxes in other cases. E.g., Maryland v. Louisana, 451 U.S. 725
(1981) (held unconstitutional a Louisana taxing statute effectively exempting
local producers from the tax by means of tax credits); Lewis v. B. T. Investment
Managers, Inc., 447 US. 27 (1980) (held unconstitutional a Florida statute ban-
ning out-of-state ownership of investment advisory service businesses operating
within Florida); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (held un-
constitutional a New Jersey statute prohibiting the use of New Jersey landfills
for out-of-state garbage).
24. 453 U.S. at 618. See Heisler, 260 U.S. at 259.
25. 453 U.S. at 619.
26. 1&
27. 1& at n.8.
28. Id. at 620. The Court characterized the appellants' complaint as one
about the rate of the tax because they sought an opportunity to show that the
tax was not fairly related to the additional costs. Id. at 620-21.
29. Id. at 621.
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taxes.0 Similarly, the majority indicated that it had consistently
rejected claims that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment"' is a barrier against unreasonable or unduly burden-
some taxation.2 Further, the Court concluded that the commerce
clause does not divest the latitude afforded the states in taxation
nor prohibit a state from requiring an activity connected to in-
terstate commerce to contribute to the general cost of govern-
ment services. Justice Marshall observed that to accept the ap-
pellants' position that interstate commerce can only be taxed for
the cost attributable to its activities would place interstate com-
merce in a privileged position.3 The majority concluded that, as
in the instant case, where the tax is not discriminatory against
interstate commerce and is apportioned to activities occurring
within the state, the tax is constitutional.'
The Court rejected the appellants' assertion that the relevant
inquiry under the fourth prong of Complete Auto Transit is the
amount of the tax in relation to the value of benefits bestowed as
measured by the costs that the state incurs on account of the
taxpayer's activities.' Rather, the Court stated that the test is
that first, the interstate business must have a substantial nexus
with the state and that second, the measure of the tax must be
reasonably related to the extent of the contact. Applying this
test, the Court concluded that the Montana tax satisfies the
fourth prong of Complete Auto Transit.' To accept the appell-
ants' view, Justice Marshall reasoned, would require an inquiry
into the appropriate rate or level of taxation, which is essentially
a matter for legislative, not judicial, resolution." Given the
30. Id at 622.
31. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[n]o state shall
... make or enforce any law which shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
32. 453 U.S. at 622. See, e.g., Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S.
369 (1934) (tax not unconstitutional under due process because it rendered a
business unprofitable).
33. 453 U.S. at 623. The court asserted that the due process clause does
not require that general revenue taxes be reasonably related to the value of
services provided to that source of tax. Id. at 622.
34. Id at 624-25. The Court noted that the depletion of Montana's coal
diminishes the resource base thereby diminishing a future source of taxes and
economic activity. Id at 624.
35. Id at 625. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. 453 U.S. at 626.
37. Id. at 628.
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numerous and competing economic, geographic, demographic,
social, and political considerations, the majority doubted whether
there would be any adequate legal test for setting such a level of
taxation.' The Court observed that it is the role of state
legislatures to set the rate of tax and then the role of Congress
to determine if a particular tax is contrary to federal interests."9
The majority stated that when the measure of a tax is
reasonably related to the taxpayer's activities in the state, the
only benefit that the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled to is
the enjoyment of the privileges of an organized society."0 The
Court also noted that a tax will be an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce only when the measure of the tax bears no
relationship to the taxpayer's presence or activities in a state.
Because the Montana tax was assessed under a formula that
related the tax liability to the value of the appellants' coal pro-
ducing activities within the state, the Court held the Montana
coal severance tax constitutional under the Complete Auto Tran-
sit test.'1
Justice Marshall then turned to the appellants' argument that
the Montana tax was invalid under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution because it substantially frustrated
the purposes of the Mineral Lands Leasing Acts of 1920 (1920
Act),' 2 which provides that the economic rents paid by lessees for
mining on federal land are to be divided between the federal
government and the states according to a formula prescribed by
the 1920 Act.'" Examining the statute in its entirety, the Court
concluded that the 1920 Act does not forbid an otherwise lawful
severance tax." The majority also rejected the appellants' argu-
38. Id
39. Id Deferring to Congress was especially appropriate in this case
because two bills, S. 178 and H.R. 1313, were introduced into the 97th Congress
to limit the rate of state severance taxes. 453 U.S. at 628.
40. 453 U.S. at 628-29. (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,
301 U.S. 495, 522 (1937).
41.. 453 U.S. at 629.
42. Id See 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1976).
43. 453 U.S. at 629-30. See 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976) which provides that the
receipts are to be divided as follows: 37.5% to the state; 52.5% to the reclama-
tion fund created by the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 191 (1976); and
the remaining 10% to the U.S. Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
44. 453 U.S. at 632. The Court noted that the Montana coal severance tax
seemingly undercuts the 1920 Act by appropriating to Montana an unjust por-
tion of the economic rents by taxing the federal lessee. However, the majority
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ment that the Montana tax is not otherwise lawful because it
frustrates the very purpose of the 1920 Act or the 1975 amend-
ments to the 1920 Act. 45
Lastly, the Court considered the appellants' contention that
the Montana tax is unconstitutional because it substantially
frustrates national energy policies.48 Noting that the appellants
were correct in observing that certain federal statutes have as
their purpose encouraging the use of coal, the Court rejected the
appellants' suggestion that such acts demonstrate the intent of
Congress to preempt all state legislation which may have an
adverse impact on the use of coal. Justice Marshall observed
that the only specific statutory provisions favoring the use of
coal were in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978
(PIFUA),'" which prohibits new electric power plants or new ma-
jor fuel-burning installations from using natural gas or petroleum
as a primary energy source and prohibits existing facilities from
using natural gas as a primary energy source after 1989."1 The
Court held, however, that PIFUA clearly contemplates the con-
tinued existence, not the preemption, of state severance taxes on
coal by taking into account severance taxes in determining eligi-
bility for environmental impact aid."
dismissed this argument by citing section 32 of the 1920 Act which provides in
pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter should be construed or held to affect the rights of
the States or other local authority to exercise any rights which they may
have including the right to levy and collect taxes upon improvements, out-
put of mines, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee of the
United States.
30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976). The Court concluded that Congress expressly authorized
the states to impose mineral severance taxes on federal lessees without impos-
ing any limits on the amount of such taxes. 453 U.S. at 63i.
45. 453 U.S. at 632. The House Report on the 1975 amendments to the 1920
Act mentions only Congressional intent to secure a fair return to the public. Id.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1975)). Justice Marshall also
noted that by definition, any state taxation of federal lessees reduces the
economic rents accruing to the federal government so the appellants' argument
would preclude any state taxes despite the explicit grant of taxing authority to
the states by section 32. 453 U.S. at 632.
46. 453 U.S. at 633. See § 2(6) of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6201(6) (1976) and § 102(b)(3) of the Power Plant and In-
dustrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA), 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III).
47. Accord, Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 8300 (1976 & Supp. III).
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8311(1), 8312(a) (1976 & Supp. III).
50. 453 U.S. at 635-36. See 42 U.S.C. § 8401(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. III).
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Thus, the Court affirmed the Montana Supreme Court's judg-
ment concluding that the appellants had failed to demonstrate
that .the Montana coal severance tax violated either the com-
merce or supremacy clauses and found that a trial was not
necessary to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the
tax.5"
Justice White joined in the majority opinion but at the same
time expressed a concern that Montana's tax may in the long run
prove to be an intolerable and unacceptable burden on interstate
commerce.52 He noted, however, that Congress has the power to
protect interstate commerce from intolerable or even undesirable
burdens and has not acted so far to prohibit such severance
taxes.53 Further, he observed that the executive branch had
urged the Court in this case not to overturn the Montana tax.'
As a result, Justice White chose to defer to the judgment of the
other branches of the federal government.55
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion56 in which he first
noted that the Court in Complete Auto Transit had unanimously
observed that a tailored tax must be carefully scrutinized by the
courts to determine whether it produces a forbidden effect on in-
terstate commerce.57 Thus, Justice Blackmun would have
remanded for a trial on the appellants' claim that the tax was
tailored to single out interstate commerce and produce a forbid-
den effect on interstate commerce because it bore no relationship
to services provided by the state.'
Justice Blackmun then observed that Montana has supplied an
increasing amount of coal over the last few years. 9 He noted
that the Montana legislature acknowledged that the coal
severance tax rate was higher than that levied by any other
51. 453 U.S. at 636-37.
52. Id. at 637 (White, J., concurring).
53. 1I See supra note 39.
54. 453 U.S. at 637 (White, J., concurring).
55. 453 U.S. at 638 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 638 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Powell and Stevens joined
in the dissent.
57. 430 U.S. at 288-89 n.15.
58. 453 U.S. at 638 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. Montana has approximately 50/o of all known United States low sulfur
coal reserves, H.R. REP. No. 1527, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980), and allegedly
exports as much as 90/o of the coal mined to out-of-state utilities. 453 U.S. at
639 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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state on the coal industry"0 and that the coal reserves of Mon-
tana' were too large to cause new coal contracts to shift to
Wyoming, which has a lower severance tax.2 In light of these
facts and Montana's realization that the tax would generate enor-
mous revenues,' Justice Blackmun characterized the issue
before the Court as whether the appellants were entitled to a
trial on their claim that the Montana coal severance tax was
borne by out-of-state consumers and was not reasonably related
to the services that those customers receive from the state. Fin-
ding these claims to be substantial, Justice Blackmun asserted
that the majority's refusal to acknowledge the claims stemmed
from a misreading of prior cases."
Justice Blackmun agreed with the majority's evaluating the
Montana coal severance tax under the four part test of Complete
Auto Transit, but felt that the majority emasculated the fourth
part of the test by holding that the relevant inquiry is whether
the measure of the tax is a fixed portion of the value of the coal
mined. 5 According to the dissent, the Court's mechanical ap-
proach suggested that any tax which is proportional instead of a
flat rate will not violate the commerce clause.6 Justice Blackmun
asserted that although interstate commerce need not be given a
privileged position, the commerce clause requires that it not be
unduly burdened. Excessive taxation on an activity such as the
coal mining here, the dissent pointed out, while facially neutral,
60. Id at 640 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Subcommittee on Fossil Fuel
Taxation, Interim Study on Fossil Fuel Taxation 14 (1974).
61. 453 U.S. at 641 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). North Dakota has a
severance tax similar to Montana and also has large coal reserves. Id. at 640.
62. Id Indeed, the 1974 Montana Subcommittee on Fossil Fuel Taxation
was directed by the Montana Legislature to investigate the feasibility and
value of multi-state taxation of coal with the Dakotas and Wyoming and to con-
tract and cooperate joining with these other states to achieve that end. Id at
n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). House Resolution No. 45, 1974 Mont. Laws, p.
1620.
63. 453 U.S. at 641 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The revenues became so
large that, beginning in 1980, at least 50% of the severance tax was to be
transferred and dedicated to a permanent trust fund which can only be ap-
propriated by a three-fourths vote of the legislature. MONT. CONST. art IX, § 5.
64. 453 U.S. at 644 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 9.
66. 453 U.S. at 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun asserted
that the majority's approach suggested that Montana's coal severance tax
would not violate the commerce clause even if it raised sufficient revenue to
allow Montana to eliminate all other taxes upon its citizens. Id at 646.
1982]
Duquesne Law Review
will not be alleviated by those political restraints which are nor-
mally exerted on legislation where it adversely affects interests
within the state because the burden falls so heavily upon inter-
state commerce. 7
The dissent admitted that a trial would require complex fac-
tual inquiries into whether economic conditions enable Montana
to export the burden of its severance tax, but did not believe
that such an inquiry was beyond judicial competence because the
issues presented were no more difficult than those routinely
dealt with in complex civil litigation. 8 If the tax is in fact a
legitimate general revenue measure identical or roughly com-
parable to taxes imposed upon similar industries, Justice
Blackmun proposed, a court's inquiry is at an end. However, if
the tax singled out a particular interstate activity and charged it
with a grossly disproportionate share of the general costs of
government, the court must determine whether the legislature
had a reasonable basis for concluding that the tax was necessary
to compensate the state for the costs imposed by that activity. 9
Justice Blackmun summarized by warning that taxes such as
Montana's coal severance tax threaten to polarize the nation and
cause the economic balkanization that the commerce clause was
designed to remedy. The dissent stated that it is the Court's
role to interpret the Constitution to determine what the states
may do when Congress does not exercise its power to regulate
interstate commerce.71 Because the courts should not abandon
this role, Justice Blackmun would have remanded to allow the
67. I& at 649 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46 n.2 (1940). According to the dissent, state severance
taxes on minerals are particularly susceptible to being tailored to fall on in-
terstate commerce and as such require a closer fit between the amount of tax
and the services provided by the state under the fourth prong of Complete
Auto Transit. 453 U.S. at 649-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id at 651 n.17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Id at 651-52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Id at 652 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979)).
71. Id at 652-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the
Governor of Montana in 1980 hearings before the Senate Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources took the position that the reasonableness of the coal
severance tax was a question most properly left to the court, not a congres-
sional committee. Id. at 652-53 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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appellants to prove their commerce clause claims and apply
careful scrutiny to this tailored tax. 2
Prior to 1938, the Supreme Court had held that the states
could not tax interstate commerce or impose a franchise tax on a
business selling only in interstate commerce even though the tax
was fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory. 3 However, in
Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 4 decided in 1938, the
Court upheld a privilege tax on a farm journal with interstate
circulation because the tax was not one which could be repeated
by other states to cause a cumulative burden on interstate com-
merce. The Court noted that "interstate business shall pay its
''75way.
Despite the Western Live Stock holding, the Court regressed
into the old standard of interstate immunity from state taxation
in 1946 in Freeman v. Hewit.1 In Freeman, the Court stated that
the fact that a tax was nondiscriminatory and fairly apportioned
was irrelevant and found a direct tax on interstate commerce un-
constitutional per se.77 Justice Rutledge, concurring in Freeman,
urged that the practical effects of a tax (possible cumulative
burden) should be scrutinized rather than tax formal phrasing (a
tax directly on interstate commerce)7 s
In spite of criticism that the Freeman Court was exalting form
over substance and was not requiring interstate commerce to
bear its just burden of taxes,9 the Court reaffirmed its position
in Spector Motor Service v. O'Connors" and enunciated a rule
72. Id. at 653 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that the ap-
pellants' supremacy clause arguments were without merit. Id at 653 n.21
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. E.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925)
(held unconstitutional a tax measured by percentages of corporate excess and
net income).
74. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
75. Id at 260.
76. 329 U.S. 249 (1946). In Freeman, Indiana levied a gross receipts tax on
sales which the court held unconstitutional as applied to sales of stock through
the New York Stock Exchange because it was a direct burden on interstate
commerce. Id
77. Id at 252.
78. Id at 279.
79. See, P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 200-04
(1953); Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 211 (1947).
80. 340 U.S. 602 (1951). Spector Motor carried freight, by truck, in in-
1982]
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that any tax upon the privilege of engaging in interstate com-
merce would be invalidated.81 However, the Spector rule was
later held inapplicable to a tax on a business's net income from
interstate commerce82 even though the unconstitutional privilege
tax in Spector was also measured by net income." Thus, the
Court found that the distinction between privilege taxes imposed
on net income and net income taxes was crucial to the validity of
the tax.84
The Spector rule was first questioned in Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in Colonial Pipeline v. Traigle,85 in which the Court
upheld a tax payable for the qualification to carry on or do
business in a corporate form." He contended that the legal
distinctions adopted by the Court were too formal and that the
precise language emphasis of the Spector rule should give way
to a more pragmatic approach."
Two years later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,88
Spector was expressly overruled.89 The Court held that the Spec-
tor rule failed to address the problems with which the commerce
clause was concerned." Justice Blackmun, author of the
unanimous Complete Auto Transit opinion, formulated the four-
terstate commerce. The Court held unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that
required corporations carrying on business in the state to pay a franchise tax
for the privilege of carrying on business in Connecticut. The tax was measured
by the net income attributable to business transactions within the state.
81. Id. at 609.
82. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450
(1959). Northwestern manufactured cement in Iowa and sold 48% of it in Min-
nesota thiough four salesmen who solicited orders there, working out of a small
Minnesota office. The tax was a net income tax fairly apportioned by'a three-
factor formula based on intrastate sales, property, and payroll.
83. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
84. W. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme
Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REV.
178-79 (1976).
85. 421 U.S. 100 (1975). Colonial Pipeline did not engage in intrastate com-
merce in Louisana, the taxing state, but did own an interstate pipeline that ran
through the state. The Court upheld Louisana's nondiscriminatory, fairly appor-
tioned franchise tax.
86. Id. at 114.
87. Id. at 112 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
88. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In Complete Auto Transit, a Mississippi tax on the
privilege of doing business was upheld as applied to a new car carrier deliver-
ing out-of-state cars in Mississippi.
89. Id. at 288-89.
90. Id. at 288.
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part test to determine the constitutionality of a state tax on in-
terstate commerce.9'
Even though Complete Auto Transit established the test for
scrutinizing state taxation of interstate commerce, the third and
fourth parts of the test were not in issue" and thus were left to
be interpreted and applied in subsequent cases. 3 The interpreta-
tion of the fourth prong of Complete Auto Transit is the key in
Commonwealth Edison. Commonwealth Edison reveals that the
test is easily satisfied by the state because the "controlling ques-
tion is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask
return."94 That language used by the Court to interpret the
fourth prong was taken as a direct quote from a commerce
clause case decided in 1940,"5 a time when the statutory language
of the tax prevailed over its practical effects in deciding whether
state taxation on interstate commerce was constitutional.
The Commonwealth Edison Court however recognized Com-
plete Auto Transit's denuciation of formalism and its emphasis
on whether the tax produced a forbidden effect on interstate
commerce, 97 and purported to follow it.9" Thus, under Complete
Auto Transit and the approach announced in Commonwealth
Edison, a state tax on interstate commerce should be found to be
unconstitutional if the forbidden effect of being unduly burden-
some on interstate commerce is present regardless of whether
the tax was proportionally burdensome to the extent of the con-
tact.
91. Id. at 279. See supra text accompanying note 9.
92. 430 U.S. at 287.
93. The Court did not interpret either the third or fourth parts of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test in a subsequent state taxation of interstate commerce
case, Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 732 (1978), where-nothing in the record alleged that
those parts were not satisfied.
94. 435 U.S. at 625 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)) where the Court upheld a Wisconsin tax on the privilege of declaring
and receiving dividends out of Wisconsin earned income.
95. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). See supra note
94.
96. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), (see supra notes 76 & 77
and accompanying text); Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951),
(see supra note 80 and accompanying text); and Justice Robert's dissent in
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) which accuses the majority of
allowing a tax to be constitutional by using an assumed name for the tax.
97. 430 U.S. at 288.
98. 453 U.S. at 615.
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The Court also warned in Complete Auto Transit that a tax
tailored to single out interstate business must receive the careful
scrutiny of the courts to determine whether it produced a forbid-
den effect on interstate commerce no matter how the effect was
accomplished.99 This careful scrutiny is lacking in Commonwealth
Edison because it was decided without receiving any evidence on
the practical effects of the tax.'01
It would seem that the proper interpretation of the fourth part
of the Complete Auto Transit test should come from Justice
Blackmun, who wrote for the unanimous Court in Complete Auto
Transit.'' Justice Blackmun's dissent in Commonwealth Edison
concluded that the majority emasculated the fourth part of the
Complete Auto Transit test."2 He would have remanded for a
trial to apply careful scrutiny to this tax tailored to fall on in-
terstate commerce which was held to be the proper standard of
review for tailored taxes in Complete Auto Transit.°3
Montana, upon retrial, could attempt to rebut the assertion
that it is exploiting a monopoly position by contending, as the at-
torneys for Montana did in their brief, that Montana is being ex-
polited due to its coal resources. Extensive mining in a state
causes economic swings and leaves scars upon the land which
must be remedied long after the coal companies have gone. This
is consistent with Montana's transferring fifty percent of the
severance tax to a trust fund for future use. 1' But a state can-
not, under the Commerce clause, export its conservation of
natural resources problems. 105 Hence, it seems that if the Court
99. 430 U.S. at 288 n.15.
100. 453 U.S. at 613.
101. Justice Blackmun also wrote a concurring opinion in Colonial Pipeline
v. Triagle, 421 U.S. 100, 114 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concurring), which urged the
overruling of Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), that came
two years later in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288
(1974).
102. 453 U.S. 645 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 638 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. at 288 n.15 (1977)).
104. 453 U.S. at 642.
105. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma statute
attempting to stop the exportation of natural minnows held violative of the
commerce clause), Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)
(purpose of the commerce clause was to make each state greater by the division
of its resources, natural and created, with every other state, and those of every
other state with it).
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would have granted a retrial and heard the monopoly and unjust
share of the tax burden argument of Commonwealth Edison,
Montana could not have avoided appearing to have pursued a
policy of OPEC-like revenue maximization."'
The dissent noted that because coal has a relatively high
transportation cost due to its weight, alternative sources of sup-
ply can only come from an area comprised of a few states. Thus,
when a state has a regional monopoly in coal and most of it is
shipped out-of-state, mineral severance can be excessively taxed
without causing a tax revolt within the state.1"7 Recognizing that
fact, the dissent concluded that such taxes are economically and
politically analogous to transportation taxes exploiting
geographical postion and thus violate the commerce clause.1"8
The Court appeared to quickly defer to state legislatures to
set the rate of severance taxes and to Congress to limit the
taxes if the taxes are an undue burden on interstate commerce.
This deference can be justified in Commonwealth Edison be-
cause two bills were introduced into the 97th Congress to limit
the rate of state severance taxes."9 Should these bills not be
passed, however, the Court might need to limit or distinguish
Commonwealth Edison in future state taxation of interstate com-
merce cases in order to give redress to citizens of another state
through taxes tailored to fall on interstate commerce.
The majority's interpretation of the fourth prong of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test differed substantially from that of
106. 453 U.S. at 643 (Blackmun, J., disgenting) (quoting R. NEHRING & B.
ZYCHER WITH J. WHARTON, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
IN THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT, 148 (1976)). The
determination of whether Montana has a monopoly or oligopoly position in coal
would require complex factual inquiries into such issues as the elasticity of de-
mand and alternate sources of supply for coal, 453 U.S. at 619 n.8, a fact conceded
by the dissent, id. at 651 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the dissent con-
tended that determining the existence of a monopoly is always a necessary step
in anti-trust litigation and that the complexity of a question is hardly a suitable
basis for refusing to adjudicate. Id. (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981)).
107. 453 U.S. at 650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (citing Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the
Position of the Judiciary 67 YALE L.J. 219, 232 (1957)).
109. 453 U.S. at 628 n.18 (citing S. 178 and H.R. 1313). Although similar
bills, S. 2695, H.R. 6625, and H.R. 6654, died in the 96th Congress, fourteen Con-
gressmen jointly filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Montana which in-
dicates a continuing Congressional interest in the bills.
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Justice Blackmun, who pronounced the test as the author of the
Court's opinion in Complete Auto Transit. Whether or not Com-
monwealth Edison represents a major shift in constitutional doc-
trine in the area of state taxation of interstate commerce will be
seen in later cases applying the Complete Auto Transit four-
prong test.
Comfrey Scott Ickes
